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UNTANGLING THE COMPLICATED 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICT 
Waseem Ahmad Qureshi* 
International Humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL) share similarities in 
their goals, purposes, and values, which try to respect and protect human dignity and mitigate 
human suffering. Similarly, IHL and HRL are interchangeably applicable during peacetime 
and wartime, each set of rules dependent on the other. Therefore, IHL and HRL interact with 
each other during armed conflicts and occupations. War is where humanity suffers most, because 
during war both IHL and HRL are violated regularly on a mass scale. Unfortunately, nations 
do not respect the prohibition on war. As a result, many decades-long wars have been fought. 
Most importantly, noncombatants suffer as a result of these kinds of armed conflict. For 
instance, millions of people in Syria have been affected and displaced owing to the ongoing armed 
conflicts. Likewise, millions more have been impacted overall in the Middle East in the name of 
fighting terrorism. In this perpetual state of belligerence, humanity is suffering. Accordingly, to 
promote the mitigation of human suffering via the limits enshrined in HRL and IHL, this 
paper will try to comprehend the subtle similarities and differences in the application, 
relationship, and interaction of IHL and HRL during armed conflicts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Human rights law (HRL) and international humanitarian law 
(IHL) are two separate sets of rules, each of which has its own rich 
legal framework1 but strikingly analogous characteristics. Even their 
names are similar, containing a common word—”human”—which 
denotes their commonality to protect human dignity and life.2 
IHL comprises four main legal concepts: the principle of 
distinction, the principle of military necessity, the principle of 
proportionality and unnecessary suffering. These principles are based 
on the desire to mitigate unnecessary human suffering and property 
destruction.3 The principle of distinction is laid down in Article 48 of 
the Additional Protocol of 1977 and the Geneva Convention (GC) of 
                                                 
 1 Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, Implementation of International Humanitarian 
Law and the Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in 
International Humanitarian Law: Challenges 213, 214 (John Carey et al. eds., 2004). 
 2 Daniel Moeckli, Human Rights and Non-discrimination in the “War on 
Terror” 92 (2008). 
 3 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law in War 285 (2010). 
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1949.4 This concept mandates that belligerents must distinguish 
between combatants and noncombatants, and noncombatant civilians 
during armed conflict must be protected from the horrors of war and 
violence.5 Similarly, the principle of military necessity is laid down in 
Article 8 of the same Additional Protocol.6 This principle dictates 
that military actions must employ the minimum use of force 
necessary to attain military goals and objectives, and this principle 
prohibits the excessive use of force in order to ensure limited civilian 
casualties and property destruction as collateral damage.7 The concept 
of proportionality maintains that the retaliatory force, in response to 
self-defense, must be reasonable in the context of the devastation it 
instigates.8 
HRL is based on the principles of nondiscrimination, such as 
the right to be treated equally,9 and on respect for human dignity, 
such as the right not to be tortured and the right not to be enslaved.10 
To understand the notions of HRL and IHL comprehensively, it is 
imperative to discuss their origins. 
Accordingly, this paper is divided into four sections. The first 
will fleetingly discuss the origins of HRL and IHL, with Subsection A 
discussing the origins of HRL and Subsection B the origins of IHL. 
The second section will cover the applicability of HRL and IHL in 
situations of armed conflicts, peacetime, and occupations. This 
                                                 
 4 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48 
(1977). 
 5 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 
1, Rules 3 (2005). 
 6 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 8 (1977). 
 7 IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 44 (2009). 
 8 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION & SELF-DEFENCE 210 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001); see also, WASEEM AHMAD QURESHI, JUST WAR 
THEORY AND EMERGING CHALLENGES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 174 (2017). 
 9 PAUL HUNT, NEGLECTED DISEASES: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS 16 
(2007), http://www.who.int/tdr/ publications/documents/seb_topic6.pdf. 
 10 Andrea Sangiovanni, Humanity Without Dignity: Moral Equality, 
Respect, and Human Rights 25 (2017). 
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section is also divided into two subsections: Subsection A will 
consider the jurisprudence of the simultaneous application of IHL 
and HRL, and Subsection B will explore the applicability of HRL and 
HL during emergencies. The third section will explore the 
relationship between IHL and HRL, discussing and building upon 
the recognized notion of lex specialis. Finally, the fourth section will 
examine the interaction between IHL and HRL. This section is also 
divided into two subsections: Subsection A will briefly look at the 
interaction between HRL and IHL in transnational armed conflicts, 
and Subsection B will examine their interaction in nontransnational 
armed conflicts. 
II. ORIGINS OF HRL AND IHL 
To arrive at a comprehensive understanding of HRL and 
IHL, this section will briefly discuss their origins. It is divided into 
two subsections. Subsection A will discuss the origins of HRL, and 
Subsection B will explore the origins of IHL. 
A. Origins of HRL 
The concept of HRL was integrated into the modern legal 
framework through the work of Greek philosophers during the sixth 
century BCE, through the concepts of natural law and the 
universality of human rights. These notions stipulate that all people 
enjoy human rights by the nature of the fact that they are humans, 
and these rights are inalienable.11 From these principles developed 
several human rights, such as the right to equality, which mandates 
that all human beings are equal in the eyes of the law.12 Later, through 
the same conceptualization, slavery was abolished and slaves were 
given a legal status equal to their former masters; they were no longer 
treated as the property of other people.13 Though slavery was the 
                                                 
 11 Lynn Hunt, The Paradoxical Origins of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND REVOLUTIONS 3, 4 (Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom et al. eds., 2007). 
 12 DAVID N. STAMOS, THE MYTH OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 129 
(Routledge ed., Paradigm Publishers 2013) (2016). 
 13 THOMAS L. KRANNAWITTER, VINDICATING LINCOLN: DEFENDING 
THE POLITICS OF OUR GREATEST PRESIDENT 98 (2008). 
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bedrock of the Greek and Roman civilizations,14 these universal 
rights mandated that all human beings are equal, that no human 
could be treated as an inferior being based on his ethnic origin, 
religion, language, or status. These rights can be traced back to Sharia 
law in the early seventh century.15 Islam propagated basic human 
rights, such as the right to equality, long before the incorporation of 
those rights into the modern legal framework.16 These modern 
human rights were even incorporated into seventh-century legal 
frameworks, such as when inalienable rights were guaranteed in the 
Constitution of Medina in CE 622.17 
In essence, HRL is all about protecting human dignity: 
anything that injures this dignity is prohibited, and anything that 
complements it is endorsed.18 HRL is regularized and supplemented 
through “international laws, declarations, treaties, agreements,” and 
“national constitutions and legislations.”19 The basic instrument that 
lays the international foundations of all HRL is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR).20 UDHR includes 
economic, social, and cultural rights as well as civil and political 
rights.21 
                                                 
 14 AUGUSTIN COCHIN, THE RESULTS OF SLAVERY “L’ABOLITION DE 
L’ESCLAVAGE” 363 (Mary L. Booth trans.,Walker, Wise, & Company, 1863); see also 
DINESH D’SOUZA, WHAT’S SO GREAT ABOUT CHRISTIANITY 71 (2008). 
 15 Mashood A. Baderin, Islamic Law and International Protection of Minority 
Rights in Context, in ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENGAGING SELF-CENTRISM 
FROM A PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVES 309, 321 (Marie-Luisa Frick et al. eds., 2013). 
 16 Syed Abbas Husain, The Wavering Waves of Change (Divine Mode of 
Culture & Civilization) 105 (2016). 
 17 A. Reis Monteiro, Ethics of Human Rights 58 (2014). 
 18 H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 126 (2nd ed., 2004). 
 19 Christian Courts, The Applicability of Human Rights Between Private Parties, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE: LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES 163 (Yvonne Donders et al. eds., 2007). 
 20 Victoria Sutton, Emergencies, Disasters, Conflicts, and Human Rights, 
in Advancing the Human Right to Health 379, 380 (José M. Zuniga et al. eds., 
2013). 
 21 Amitabh Behar, A Ground Reality to Assess the Realization of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in India, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUDGETS IN INDIA 597, 
601 (Yamini Mishra et al., 2009). 
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B. Origins of IHL 
By contrast, the chronological progression of IHL can be 
traced back to the Geneva Convention of 1864 (GC).22 The first 
creditable expression of the term IHL was articulated in the GC.23 
This incorporation of IHL was meant to improve the conditions of 
injured soldiers on the battlefield.24 IHL can also be seen in the 
Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which discusses excessive 
suffering along with the humanitarian rights of soldiers.25 Similarly, 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 considers “humanitarian activities” 
and “humanitarian organizations.”26 However, besides tracing the use 
of IHL in the legal framework, the most important reason to analyze 
the origins of IHL is to examine its true historical understandings. 
Since IHL is only applicable during war or armed conflict,27 it is 
known as the “law of war” or the “law of armed conflict.”28 The 
main objective of IHL is to reduce human suffering during conflict. 
In a sense, IHL humanizes wars by curtailing unnecessary brutality 
and destruction.29 It also restricts violence by belligerents in order to 
protect noncombatants and attempts to proscribe unwarranted 
obliteration through principles such as the “principle of 
distinction.”30 This concept obliges that “ . . . as soon as they 
[combatants] lay them [their arms] down and surrender, they cease to 
                                                 
 22 Emily Crawford & Alison Pert, International Humanitarian Law 120 
(2015). 
 23 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Humanitarian Law, in 
International Criminal Law: Vol. I Sources, Subjects and Contents 269, 281 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Sylvain Beauchamp, “Humanitarian Space” in Search of a New Home, in 
Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations, 
and the Law 199, 211 (Benjamin Perrin ed., 2012); see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill 
& Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 444 (3rd ed. 2007). 
 27 Jeroen C. van den Boogaard, Fighting by the Principles: Principles as a Source 
of International Humanitarian Law, in ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
IN SEARCH OF THE HUMAN FACE 3, 21 (Mariëlle Matthee et al. eds., 2013). 
 28 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 847 (7th ed., 2014). 
 29 U.C. JHA, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE LAWS OF WAR 
216 (2011). 
 30 Sandesh Sivakumaran, International Humanitarian Law, in International 
Human Rights Law 479, 480 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds. 2014). 
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be enemies or agents of the enemy, and again become mere men, and 
it is no longer legitimate to take their lives.”31 IHL is not meant to 
stop or criminalize wars:32 its purpose is solely to humanize them.33 
Critics of IHL, however, argue that its application prolongs the 
duration of a war, which acts paradoxically since elongated wars 
worsen human suffering.34 By contrast, the proponents of IHL 
contend that having a longer war is better than having a shorter, yet 
more brutal or inhuman war.35 Nonetheless, IHL balances the 
intricacies of human suffering, property destruction, and military 
necessity.36 This balance is mechanized through the legal framework 
of regulations known as jus in bello, or the laws of war. Any violation 
of these regulations is referred to as a “war crime.”37 
IHL and HRL share some similarities owing to their similar 
goals, purposes, and values, which try to respect and protect human 
dignity as well as mitigate human suffering.38 Similarly, IHL and HRL 
are interchangeably applicable during peacetime and wartime,39 with 
                                                 
 31 Daphné Richemond-Barak, Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts, in NEW 
BATTLEFIELDS/OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 106, 
113 (William C. Banks ed., 2011). 
 32 Yves Sandoz, International Humanitarian Law in the Twenty-First Century, in 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Vol. 6 3, 5 (Timothy McCormack 
ed., 2003). 
 33 William C. Banks, Towards an Adaptive International Humanitarian Law, in 
NEW BATTLEFIELDS/OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
1 ,19 (William C. Banks ed., 2011). 
 34 Hugo Slim, Wonderful Work Globalizing the Ethics of Humanitarian Action, in 
The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action 13, 23 (Roger Mac Ginty et al. 
eds., 2015). 
 35 FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
WAGING OF WAR 3 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987). 
 36 Sivakumaran, supra note 30, at 480. 
 37 DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY 
CLAUSES: SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN TREATY INTERPRETATION 341 (2012). 
 38 MOECKLI, supra note 2, at 92. 
 39 JOST DELBRÜCK, WILFRIED FIEDLER, & JOST DELBRÜCK, GERMAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW/JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 
196 (DUNCKER & HUMBLOT, 1983); see also Howard S. Levie, Violations of Human 
Rights in time of War as War Crimes, in ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 119, 
119 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1994). 
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each set of rules dependent on the other for its application.40 
Therefore, IHL and HRL interact with each other during armed 
conflicts and occupations.41 War is where humanity suffers most, 
because during war both IHL and HRL are violated regularly on a 
mass scale.42 Unfortunately, nations do not respect the prohibition on 
war. As a result, decades-long wars are fought repeatedly.43 Most 
importantly, noncombatant civilians suffer from these kinds of armed 
conflict. For instance, millions of people in Syria have been affected 
and displaced owing to ongoing wars.44 Moreover, millions more 
have been impacted generally in the Middle East in the name of 
fighting terrorism.45 In these armed conflicts, Western states are 
arming rebellions46 and fighting proxy wars against the sovereign 
nations of the Middle East in the name of supporting regime 
change.47 In fact, these arms are used against sovereign states, which 
                                                 
 40 Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Cultural Heritage in Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law, in International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 250, 
251 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). 
 41 Peter Vedel Kessing, The Use of Soft Law in Regulating Armed Conflicts: From 
Jus in Bello to ‘Soft Law in Bello’?, in Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human 
Rights 129, 133 (Stephanie Lagoutte et al. eds., 2016). 
 42 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOODSHED IN THE CAUCASUS: 
VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GEORGIA-
SOUTH OSSETIA CONFLICT (Mar. 1992), https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs 
/g/georgia/georgia.923/georgia923full.pdf. 
 43 Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson, Introduction: International Conflict 
and Security Law, in Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law 
1, 1 (Nigel D. White & Christian White eds., 2013). 
 44 V.G. Julie Rajan, Women, Violence, and the Islamic State: Resurrecting the 
Caliphate Through Femicide in Iraq and Syria, in Violence and Gender in the Globalized 
World: The Intimate and the Extimate 45, 60 (Sanja Bahun et al. eds., 2016). 
 45 Tatah Mentan, The Elusiveness of Peace in a Suspect Global System 300 
(2016); see also Kit O’Connell, 4 Million Muslims Killed in Western Wars: Should We Call 
it Genocide?, Mintpressnews (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.mintpressnews.com/4-
million-muslims-killed-in-western-wars-should-we-call-it-genocide/208711/. 
 46 To see US is abetting NSA see Paul Battersby, Global Crime and Global 
Security, in The SAGE Handbook of Globalization 697, 706 (Manfred B. Steger et 
al. eds., 2014); see also David Scheffer, The Imoact of the War Crimes Tribunals on 
Corporate Liability for Atrocity Crimes Under US law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW 
GLOBAL ECONOMY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY? 152, 167 (Charlotte 
Walker-Said & John D. Kelly eds., 2015). 
 47 To see Western States are abetting NSA for regime change see Chris 
Landsberg & Jo-Ansie van Wyk, A review of South Africa’s peace diplomacy since 1994, in 
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weakens the infrastructure of a state to such an extent that it is no 
longer able to fight rebellions.48 In this perpetual system of 
belligerence, humanity is suffering. To promote the mitigation of 
human suffering via the regulations of HRL and IHL, it is vital to 
comprehend the subtle similarities and differences in the application, 
relationship, and interaction of IHL and HRL. 
III. APPLICABILITY 
According to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, IHL is generally applicable during wartime or during an 
armed conflict.49 By contrast, HRL is mostly applicable during 
peacetime; however, certain human rights continue to be applicable 
during warfare or armed conflict.50 Emergency clauses in the legal 
framework allow states to derogate from certain human rights in an 
emergency situation.51 The remaining fundamental human rights are 
deemed non-derogable, such as the right not to be enslaved, even 
during conflicts or wartime.52 These non-derogable human rights are 
also known as the “hardcore of human rights.”53 Most notably, the 
International Conference of Human Rights in Tehran of 196854 and 
the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards of 1990 (also 
                                                 
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 84, 106 (Chris Landsberg et at. eds., 
2012). 
 48 See Rachel Blevins, Media Silent as Syrian Forces Finally Defeat Isis, Finding 
Cache of Made in USA Weapons, The Free Thought Project (Nov. 10, 2017), 
http://thefreethoughtproject.com/syrian-forces-defeat-isis-weapons-found/. 
 49 Lindsay Moir, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict, in The 1949 
Geneva Conventions: A Commentary 390, 396 (Andrew Clapham et al. 2015). 
 50 MOHAMAD GHAZI JANABY, THE LEGAL REGIME APPLICABLE TO 
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANY PERSONNEL IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
162 (2016). 
 51 Evan J. Criddle, Introduction: Testing Human Rights Theory During 
Emergencies, in Human Rights in Emergencies 1, 15 (Evan J. Criddle ed. 2016). 
 52 CARMEN TIBURCIO, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE Law 76-78 (2001). 
 53 FRANÇOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER ET AL., THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 192 (Laura Brav & Camille Michel eds. trans., Rowman & 
Littlefield Pub. 2013). 
 54 See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (May 13, 1968). 
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known as the Turku Declaration of 1990)55 considered the 
application of HRL during armed conflicts. The consideration in 
these instruments, combined with other international instruments, 
criticize the division between IHL and HRL and advocate for their 
application in harmony with each other during armed conflict.56 
HRL and IHL have multiple objectives in common. For 
instance, both sets of rules attempt to protect human beings.57 The 
only apparent conceptual difference between them is that one set 
protects human beings during war, the other during peacetime.58 The 
non-derogable nature of certain human rights59 and the application of 
human rights during armed conflicts,60 together with the fact that 
wars have been prolonged for decades61 and drone attacks are 
routinely conducted during peacetime,62 have mitigated the line 
distinguishing between HRL and IHL.63 As a result, IHL is applicable 
during peacetime, without the existence of material wars, in the form 
                                                 
 55 See Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (Dec. 2, 1990). 
 56 See TATHIANA FLORES ACUÑA, THE UNITED NATIONALS MISSION TO 
EL SALVADOR: A HUMANITARIAN LAW PERSPECTIVE34 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 1995). 
To see the 1968 instrument in the same context see Orna Ben-Naftali, Introduction: 
International Humnaitarian Law and International Human Rights Law—Pas de Deux, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 3, 4 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). To see the 1990 instrument in the same 
context see KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, SOCIAL REGULATION IN THE 
WTO: TRADE POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 64 (2010). 
 57 See MOECKLI, supra note 2, at 92. 
 58 Law Soc’y of Ireland, Human Rights Law 143 (Brid Moriarty & Eva 
Massa eds., 4th ed. 2012). 
 59 See TIBURCIO, supra note 51. 
 60 See LAW SOC’Y OF IRELAND, supra note 57. 
 61 To see Afghanistan two decades war see LARRY P. GOODSON, 
AFGHANISTAN’S ENDLESS WAR: STATE FAILURE, REGIONAL POLITICS, AND THE 
RISE OF THE TALIBAN 4 (2001). To see a decade long war on terror see PAUL 
ROGERS, WHY WE’RE LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR, at chapter 6 (2008) . 
 62 Mehrdad Vahabi, The Political Economy of Predation: Man-Hunting 
and the Economics of Escape 5 (2015); see also Gloria Gaggioli, Remoteness and 
Human Rights Law, in Research Handbook on Remote Warfare 133, 171 (Jens David 
Ohlin ed., 2017). 
 63 Ben-Naftali, supra note 56, at 9. 
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of armed conflicts, civil wars, or occupations.64 Interestingly, the laws 
of necessity, proportionality, and distinction, which are principles of 
IHL, are applicable without actual armed conflicts. For example, 
recent drone attacks conducted in Pakistan and Syria were actually 
conducted without any armed conflict between states, in the name of 
fighting terrorism.65 In this context, the question of collateral damage 
and the principles of distinction were raised and applied by academics 
in conducting drone strikes.66 Moreover, certain IHL instruments 
from the United Nations General Assembly include mitigating terms 
such as “Respect of Human Rights in Armed Conflict,”67 which 
invigorate the relationship between HRL and IHL. Similarly, HRL is 
also applicable during armed conflicts and wars.68 For instance, 
during armed conflicts between rebels and the Syrian state—where 
rebellions were armed and supported by other countries69—HRL 
was, and is, still applicable.70 Moreover, the core of human rights is 
applicable and enforceable at all times, and states cannot derogate 
from them in any circumstances.71 In its famous advisory opinion in 
the Wall case72 and the case of Congo v. Uganda73, the International 
                                                 
 64 Jann K. Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, in The 
Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations 35, 45 (Terry D. Gill & 
Dieter Fleck eds., 2015). 
 65 See U.C. Jha, Drone Wars: Ethical, Legal and Strategic 
Implications: Ethical, Legal and Strategic Implications (2014). 
 66  David Turns, Droning on: some international humanitarian in law 
aspects of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary armed conflicts, in 
Contemporary Challenges to the Laws of War: Essays in Honour of Professor 
Peter Rowe 191, 208 (Caroline Harvey et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the distinction 
and collateral damage); Maya Brehm, International humanitarian law and the 
protection of civilian from the effects of explosive weapons, in Contemporary 
Challenges to the Laws of War: Essays in Honour of Professor Peter Rowe 235, 
241 (Caroline Harvey et al. eds., 2014) (discussing proportionality in Pakistan); Id. 
at 263 (discussing necessity). 
 67 See Respect of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, UNGA RES 2444, 
1968. 
 68 JANABY, supra note 49, at 162. 
 69 Battersby, supra note 46, at 706 
 70 Janaby, supra note 49, at 182; see also Kessing, supra note 41, at 132. 
 71 FRANÇOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 192 (2013). 
 72 [2004] ICJ Rep 136 
 73 [2004] ICJ Rep 136 
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Court of Justice (ICJ) established that HRL is applicable during 
armed conflicts and occupations by belligerents.74 
A. Jurisprudence of the Simultaneous Application of HRL and IHL 
For these reasons, it becomes impossible to dichotomize 
HRL and IHL based on their applicability criteria, since both HRL 
and IHL are applicable in peacetime as well as in war.75 In the Wall 
case’s famous advisory opinion, the ICJ explicitly discussed this 
dilution of difference by establishing that HRL and IHL concurrently 
apply in armed conflicts and occupations.76 Within the case’s context 
of occupants’ belligerent acts, any such actions are “null and void” if 
they violate pertinent provisions of IHL or HRL.77 The ICJ further 
elaborated in this case that construction of a wall in Palestine violated 
HRL (Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907) and IHL 
(Article 53 of IV Geneva Convention).78 The ICJ supplemented the 
argument that the construction of the wall violated IHL by ruling that 
it was not a “military necessity.”79 In support of the argument that the 
construction of the wall violated HRL, the ICJ more particularly 
                                                 
 74 Tom Ruys and Sten Verhoeven, The Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Occupied Territories, in International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in 
International Law 155, 155 (Roberta Arnold, Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008) ;see also 
Sikander Ahmed Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal 
and Socio-political Aspects 117 (2014). 
 75 JOST DELBRÜCK & WILFRIED FIEDLER, supra note 39, at 196; see also 
Levie, supra note 39, at 119. 
 76 Kessing, supra note 41, at 133. 
 77 Theodor Schweisfurth, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma 1298, 1306 (Ulrich 
Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011). 
 78 Mika Nishimura Hayashi, The Martens Clause and Military Necessity, in The 
Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and the Customary Law 
of Armed Conflict 141 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2016); Legal Consequences of the 
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stated that the construction violated the right to work, the right to 
health, the right to education, and the right to a basic standard of 
living under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).80 The court added that the construction 
also violated the right to movement and the right to choose a place of 
residence under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).81 
This parallel application of HRL and IHL can also be seen in 
the occupation case of Congo v. Uganda.82 In this case, the state of 
Congo contended that Uganda’s occupation of Congolese territory 
violated HRL and IHL with respect to the Congolese population83. 
The court explicitly established that Uganda had indeed 
simultaneously violated HRL and IHL.84 The mere fact that the court 
established that Uganda had violated both sets of rules 
simultaneously85 supports the assertion that both legal frameworks 
are concurrently applicable. The International Criminal Tribunal 
(ICT) also validates this assertion, as it has established the concept 
that HRL and IHL complement each other and their respective 
scopes and applications overlap.86 The ICT adds that this nexus exists 
because IHL and HRL have similarities in their core values, goals, 
purposes, and terminologies.87 However, the ICT set criteria for 
fusing HRL and IHL by stating “that notions developed in the field 
of human rights can be transposed in international humanitarian law 
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only if they take into consideration the specificities of the latter body 
of law.”88 
B. Application of HRL and IHL during Emergencies 
Further, there are certain derogable human rights that are not 
applicable during armed conflicts or public emergencies.89 Article 4 of 
the ICCPR and Article 15 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) provide room for the derogability of human rights 
during such instances.90 According to these Articles, a state can 
derogate from its HRL responsibilities in situations where the very 
existence of the state is at stake.91 But the derogability of some rights 
does not mean that the state can ignore its other responsibilities, such 
as its obligations under IHL.92 This assertion is explicitly incorporated 
in the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 2993. As 
soon as the state deviates from its HRL responsibilities, IHL 
obligations are applicable,94 because IHL is specifically applicable in 
situations in which human rights are derogated and IHL is applicable 
during armed conflicts or war.95 
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The norms of IHL are generally based on the notions of 
military necessity, proportionality, and distinction.96 These principles 
attempt to humanize violence and destruction and do not really 
regulate the rights and powers of the belligerents.97 The notions of jus 
in bello and jus ad bellum combined can be used to evaluate the 
justification of the belligerent’s actions to ensure the legality of the 
aggression or armed conflict98 and to see whether, in light of any 
impact such belligerence may have, IHL regulations come into play.99 
Therefore, the application of HRL in harmony with IHL is 
appropriate to judge crimes against humanity or evaluate human 
suffering.100 For instance, many belligerents argue that IHL is 
applicable in fighting terrorism;101 however, in a true sense of the 
legality of the use of force, since there is no material armed conflict, 
IHL is not applicable under Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 
1949 and its Additional Protocol I of 1977.102 As IHL and HRL are 
closely related and can be interchangeably applicable in certain 
circumstances, yet cannot change places in others, it is important to 
discuss the relationship and interaction between IHL and HRL in 
detail. The next two sections of this paper will respectively discuss 
the relationship and interaction between IHL and HRL. 
IV. RELATIONSHIP: THE NOTION OF “LEX SPECIALIS” 
After concluding that HRL protection is not withdrawn 
during armed conflicts and emergencies, the ICJ in its Wall case 
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advisory opinion established certain conditions for a relationship 
between HRL and IHL.103 The court said that: 
Some rights may be exclusively matters of [IHL]; 
others may be exclusively matters of [HRL]; yet 
others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law. In order to answer the question put 
to it, the Court will have to take into consideration 
both these branches of international law, namely 
human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law.104 
ICJ bifurcated all humanitarian law into HRL and IHL by 
defining an exclusive framework of these rights regarding their 
applicability in certain distinct circumstances. Yet, it also 
acknowledged that there can be situations in which these lines can 
merge and both sets of rules can be simultaneously applied.105 ICJ 
ruled that, in such a relationship between HRL and IHL, the doctrine 
of lex specialis is applicable.106 
In legal doctrine, lex specialis is a guideline principle related to 
the interpretation of a law that is applicable in both the domestic and 
international legal settings.107 Lex specialis is a Latin phrase that means 
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“law governing a specific subject matter,”108 derived from a renowned 
axiom, lex specialis derogat legi generali, which means “special laws 
override general laws.”109 This concept mandates that, in certain 
settings, if two sets of laws simultaneously govern the legal 
framework of a given situation, then the rules with specific scope (lex 
specialis) will override the general set of rules (lex generalis).110 
For instance, in the specific setting of the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life under Article 6 of ICCPR, the ICJ 
illustrated the notion of lex specialis111 as follows: 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of 
one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is 
an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to 
be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, 
the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed 
to regulate the conduct of hostilities.112 
By establishing this, the ICJ overlooked the general 
applicability of lex generalis in relation with HR and concentrated on 
the specific applicability of lex specialis, which overrode the prior set 
of general rules.113 It is interesting to note here that if the relevant 
facts involved a general deprivation of life, then the general right to 
life should have been applied. But, since the case concerned the 
arbitrary deprivation of life, the court only analyzed applicable IHL 
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under Article 6, while explicitly making reference to lex specialis 
doctrine.114 
Michael Dennis argues that during armed conflicts, the 
application of IHL categorically excludes the application of HRL, 
such that HRL ceases to exist by applying the principle of lex 
specialis.115 This is because HRL is more generalized law whereas IHL 
is largely specific in nature, applying directly to the particular settings 
of armed conflicts.116 Analyses like this are underhanded attempts to 
undermine the application of HRL during armed conflicts, which 
goes against the conventional standards of the international 
community. For instance, the ICJ went so far as to explicitly establish 
that HRL does not cease to exist during wars.117 Dennis’s argument is 
also not in congruence with the principle of lex specialis, which 
concerns two set of rules simultaneously applying, and conflicting, 
within a particular condition.118 There can be situations where HRL 
and IHL are both lex specialis.119 Therefore, the applicability of HRL 
and IHL can be delineated within the confines of a given situation of 
armed conflict, where one set of rules cannot ab initio exclude the 
other without considering the appropriation of the other’s relevant 
laws.120 
Inversely, the true interpretation of the doctrine of lex specialis 
by rational scholars shows that specific IHL are given preeminence 
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over generalized HRL when both HR and IHL present contradictory 
resolutions against unchanged given settings.121 For instance, during 
an armed conflict, IHL would allow killing of belligerents within the 
rules of distinction, necessity, and proportionality;122 however, under 
HRL, it would be a violation to kill the same individuals due to the 
wider regulations of proportionality in HRL.123 However, it is 
pertinent to note here that, while such an analysis dismisses the 
contradiction between HRL and IHL, it is ambiguous whether it 
accommodates the ICJ’s established norms under the Wall case and 
the distinguished advisory opinion of the Nuclear Weapons case. For 
instance, it is essential to ask why the ICJ established that life could 
not be deprived arbitrarily by IHL and reasoned that IHL only 
interprets an interjection of the word arbitrary within the same 
context,124 while disregarding the fact that IHL did not completely 
overlook or abrogate the right to life under HRL; rather, it 
complemented the right to life.125 
The works of Professor Martti Koskenniemi, an international 
lawyer and a former Finnish diplomat, are key to understanding the 
scope and functions of the doctrine of lex specialis in relation to lex 
generalis in such a situation.126 According to Koskenniemi, the 
relationship between HRL and IHL is best demonstrated in two 
ways: 
[Primarily], a particular rule may be conceived as an 
expression to the general rule. In this case, the 
particular derogates from the general rule. 
[Secondly], a particular rule may be considered an 
application of the general rule in a given 
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circumstance. That is to say, it may give instructions 
on what a general rule requires in the case at hand.127 
Koskenniemi states that lex generalis falls under HRL because 
it offers a general scope of rights, whereas lex specialis falls under IHL 
because it offers a specific scope of application.128 Through 
Koskenniemi’s analysis, it becomes clear that particular rules (lex 
specialis) offer two major functions. One, such rules can either 
abrogate general rules by expressing exclusion; or, two, they can 
complement general rules by lending specificity to the given situation 
by expressing inclusion.129 Either way, lex specialis governs the setting 
of facts in a given situation.130 
Consequently, the question of lex specialis is either expressly 
included in the general rules or deliberately excluded from the legal 
frameworks.131 These conditions will be referred to as the inclusion 
and exclusion, respectively, of lex generalis while applying lex specialis. 
On one side, the deviation of state laws from HRL in times of war or 
emergency is an example of deliberately excluding certain rules by 
explicit expression. The application of lex specialis does not necessarily 
exclude lex generalis.132 If the legal framework does not specifically 
exclude lex generalis, then it is not necessarily excluded by only the 
application of lex specialis. On the other side, principles of jus cogens 
and the incorporation of non-derogatory human rights are examples 
of expressing the inclusion of lex generalis in the application of lex 
specialis.133 Other than these two scenarios, in situations where the law 
is silent on a given issue regarding lex specialis, courts are entrusted to 
interpret the predominance of legal sets.134 
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As discussed, legal frameworks may expressly include or 
exclude general rules while applying lex specialis. Application of lex 
specialis can build up details upon general rules in a specific scenario. 
This consideration is applicable in situations where lex specialis merely 
adopts the same principles of general rules while applying them in 
more specific situations with additional rubrics.135 This kind of 
application of lex specialis requires close judicial scrutiny and 
interpretation. An analysis of the ICJ on the inclusion of word 
“arbitrary” under Article 6 of the ICCPR in the Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion provides a precise illustration of this type of lex 
specialis application.136 
Koskenniemi’s model of analysis of lex specialis concerns the 
application of lex specialis and lex generalis, yet it raises certain novel 
questions as well. Koskenniemi argues that “IHL must be regarded as 
lex specialis in relation to—and thus override—rules laying out the 
peacetime norms relating to the same subjects.”137 Koskenniemi’s 
consideration of IHL as lex specialis and HRL as lex generalis raises 
multiple questions: is this consideration always applicable in every 
situation? In a same given situation, does IHL always supersede 
HRL? And does perpetually considering IHL as lex specialis encumber 
HRL’s jurisprudence? 
Koskenniemi argues that, since lex specialis is about applying 
more specific rules against general rules, IHL is lex specialis, because it 
is applied during armed conflicts and is therefore more specific.138 
Koskenniemi acknowledges that general and special rules are 
identified through their application in a given situation.139 By 
considering IHL as lex specialis in armed conflicts, he overlooks the 
possibility that the criterion of an existing armed conflict does not 
necessarily particularize a situation by prioritizing IHL, because there 
can be situations within armed conflicts in which HRL can offer 
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more comprehensive regulation than IHL.140 For instance, the 
ICESCR (HRL) is more specific regarding regulations of health than 
Article 55 of GC IV (IHL).141 More specifically, Articles 7, 10, and 12 
of the ICESCR (HRL) complement Article 55 of GC IV (IHL).142 
There seems to be no reason why HRL in this situation cannot 
complement IHL during armed conflict. Thus, it is rationally 
established that during an armed conflict, HRL can be more 
elaborative than IHL.143 Therefore, HRL can be considered lex 
specialis during an armed conflict.144 The next section of this paper will 
illustrate in detail that HRL can be more fitting and elaborative in 
certain situations than IHL can be. Consequently, both HRL and 
IHL can be considered lex specialis, and the application of the doctrine 
of lex specialis does not obstruct HRL jurisprudence.145 Moreover, it 
can also be seen that lex specialis can complement general rules by 
adding details to their specific application.146 
Another perspective from which to scrutinize the relationship 
between HRL and IHL in lex specialis is to consider whether, when lex 
specialis are applicable to a given situation and lex generalis are 
derogable within same context, interpreting lex generalis can offer any 
consideration. For instance, in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, 
the ICJ considered the interpretation of the word “arbitrary” in 
analyzing IHL as lex specialis, or specific rules.147 In this opinion, does 
analyzing the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR offer any 
benefit? Why did the ICJ even discuss the ICCPR’s general notion of 
the right to life when it could have easily just applied HRL as a 
specific law? Some scholars argue that such inclusion is meant to 
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encompass the exercise of jurisdiction over a treaty,148 while others 
argue that such an inclusion of HRL alongside IHL is to demonstrate 
moral condemnation that an action undignifies the human right to 
life.149 However, this inclusion is merely embellishment; it does not 
offer any supplemental security to people’s lives during armed 
conflict. For these reasons, it can be cogently construed that 
discussion of the term “arbitrary” in the advisory opinion includes 
both IHL and HRL.150 
Moreover, to complement HRL, the use of the word 
“arbitrary” has to consider the rules of IHL, such as the notion of 
necessity during armed conflict. Within the same context, the term 
has to also consider guidelines of HRL, such as the right to life.151 
The combined effect of the considerations of HRL and IHL makes it 
more difficult for an oppressor or aggressor to justify its actions 
regarding the killing of civilians during the course of an armed 
attack.152 Through such inclusion, the conventional protection of the 
right to life during an armed conflict can be easily reinforced. In 
conclusion, such protection of reinforcement demands that lex 
specialis must also incorporate interaction between HRL and IHL.153 
V. INTERACTION 
In one school of thought, a handful of scholars believe that 
HRL can be used to complement IHL by simultaneously applying 
both sets of rules.154 In the other school of thought, academics argue 
that, since IHL is more specific and particular, resorting to HRL 
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while considering IHL cannot addconsiderable value in application.155 
The latter school substantiates its argument by contending that 
during armed conflicts, military personnel in action need concrete, 
practical rules.156 This school adds that, within the same context, the 
practical application of IHL offers specific and concrete scope, while 
HRL is more generalized and abstract.157 Therefore, during an armed 
conflict, abstract HRL cannot add any value, and IHL and HRL 
shouldn’t be applied simultaneously.158 For instance, the guidelines 
under GC III do not abstractly ask military personnel to just treat 
injured people compassionately. Rather, it provides a detailed 
framework, substantial guidelines about running camps, and positive 
duties regarding helping injured people.159 
Consequently, IHL can offer more extensive protections to 
individuals during armed conflicts owing to its specificity and 
practicality.160 Nonetheless, these protections are guided through 
regulations via a planned legal framework, and the planning of this 
legal framework requires guidance and direction.161 In such a 
scenario, the frameworks and guidelines of HRL are indispensable. In 
a way, HRL is used to lay the foundations of IHL guidelines, 
essentially creating a system in which HRL and IHL work side-by-
side.162 For instance, careful planning about what type of property can 
and cannot be targeted during an armed conflict stems from the 
principles of HRL.163 Analogous to the second school of thought 
above, it can be argued that military personnel do not directly follow 
the guidelines of IHL but instead follow directives of military codes 
of conduct; therefore, IHL is not applicable at all. Such a conclusion 
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would be wrong and irrational, as “military codes of conduct” are 
developed by following the strict guidelines of IHL.164 Similarly, it 
would be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that HRL is not 
applicable during armed conflict because military personnel only use 
specified IHL: IHL guidelines were developed following the 
principles of HRL.165 In other words, if military codes can resort to 
HRL, there is no reason why IHL cannot do so.166 
In fact, when a set of rules degenerates and requires richness 
in a certain area, it can always resort to the other set.167 This means 
that the legal framework of HRL often relies on the specificity of 
IHL, and rules of IHL often rely on the establishment and 
application of HRL.168 So, the interpretations of HRL and IHL 
routinely interact with each other for reference, application, 
practicality, and specificity.169 For instance, while interpreting the 
right to life under Article 6 of ICCPR (HRL) in an armed conflict, 
the ICJ relied on IHL owing to its particularity of the word 
“arbitrariness.”170 Similarly, IHL under Article 3 of GC III relied on 
HRL for the interpretation of “inhumane treatment” in the context 
of the war camp.171 More specifically, civilians’ judicial guarantees 
under the Geneva Convention cannot be ascertained without 
resorting to the understandings and practicality of HRL.172 Similarly, 
other prevailing guarantees for individuals and courts under Article 
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84 of GC III are complemented by the HRL concepts of fairness, 
neutrality, and liberty.173 
A. Transnational Armed Conflict 
In transnational armed conflicts, HRL and IHL readily 
interact with each other in order to expand protections to people 
living in hostile territories.174 More particularly, during international 
armed conflicts some individuals may not be protected by IHL at all, 
and the application of expansive HRL can protect their lives and 
well-being. IHL offers protection to nationals of an attacked and 
oppressed nation,175 whereas HRL can expand this protection to 
nationals of an aggressive state.176 For instance, Article 4 of GC IV 
under IHL only covers nationals of an oppressed or attacked 
nation.177 Scholars argue that the right to life under HRL can be 
extended to safeguard the rights of citizens of the aggressor state.178 
Similarly, nationals of any country neutral to a conflict are not 
protected under Article 4 of GC IV;179 the HRL right to life can be 
extended to safeguard the rights and lives of these individuals in a 
similar manner.180 
Analogously, the principles of IHL interact with HRL in the 
situations and scenarios of occupied territories.181 When any territory 
is occupied, many citizens living in that territory as civilians continue 
to live under military occupation. The belligerent state rules these 
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occupied territories and the lives of these civilians. In this context, 
however, HRL does not offer much help regarding the protection of 
the usual rights of these civilians other than providing rudimentary 
principles, such as the notion of distinction.182 Rather than only 
offering the protection of HRL, the protection of the normal human 
rights applicable during peacetime must also be extended to civilians 
living in these occupied territories.183 Scholars have pointed out that 
the protection offered under IHL is obsolete, and this protection was 
only meant for wartime and armed conflicts. Situations like military 
occupations that last decades, such as the occupations currently going 
on in the Middle East, were never envisioned when the rules of IHL 
were laid down.184 Therefore, in the occupied territories, normal 
peacetime principles of HRL must also be extended to civilians.185 
For example, the right to a fair trial must be exercisable when 
individuals are routinely detained without probable cause, as has been 
the case in Palestine for decades.186 Similarly, the freedom of 
expression and non-derogable human rights must also be offered to 
civilians living under occupation.187 Likewise, legal doctrines of HRL 
regarding national security and public order can be evaluated to 
determine the reasonability of transfers of civilian population during 
armed conflict under Article 49 of GC IV.188 
Similarly, IHL must be used to complement HRL in 
situations where HRL lacks detailed orientation. For instance, HRL 
does not offer detailed protection for civilians in missing persons 
cases in wartime or peacetime,189 whereas GC III and GC IV have a 
detailed framework regarding the protection of missing persons in 
occupied territories.190 GC obliges occupying states to provide 
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particulars of detained persons regarding the locations and reasons of 
their imprisonment. GC even goes as far as to oblige states to recover 
missing persons and investigate their cases.191 Moreover, IHL can 
extend more protection to civilians than HRL, because IHL does not 
derogate in times of war. Rather, IHL is more particularly applicable 
to emergencies and armed conflicts.192 
B. Nontransnational Armed Conflict 
The interaction of HRL and IHL is more ad hoc in non-
international armed conflicts than in transnational armed conflicts, as 
IHL is more easily applicable in transnational armed conflicts193 and 
HRL is more easily applicable in non-transnational armed conflicts.194 
Article 3 of GC provides for rudimentary IHL principles in non-
transnational armed conflicts;195 though these principles are appended 
by additional protocols and other developed nations within IHL, the 
overall legal framework for the situations of non-transnational armed 
conflict is still less developed than in transnational armed conflicts.196 
For these reasons, it is only reasonable and efficient to resort to HRL 
during non-transnational armed conflicts while applying IHL.197 For 
instance, Article 14 of ICCPR and Article 6 of ECHR, together with 
jurisprudential scope of HRL,198 give a true understanding of the 
functioning of IHL in application and practicality of Article 3 of 
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GC,199 which provides basic judicial and general guarantees for 
civilians and courts.200 
By conjoining the legal sets of rules of HRL and IHL, the 
protection of civilians can be expanded during non-transnational 
armed conflicts.201 On one side, the legal framework of HRL is 
already in place to protect individuals against infringements of their 
rights.202 On the other side, during an internal armed conflict between 
two groups or between the state and organized groups, a government 
can choose to apply the legal mechanisms of IHL.203 Applying IHL 
during non-transnational conflicts together with HRL in an 
interaction is made possible204 by the malleability of the threshold to 
apply IHL under Article 3 of GC.205 For instance, Article 3 of GC 
does not outline the limits or severity of violence necessary to 
constitute an armed conflict which would trigger the application of 
IHL.206 However, Article 1 of Additional Protocol II (AP II) details 
prerequisites of Article 3 of GC to constitute an armed conflict.207 
The threshold under AP II is higher than that of Article 3 of GC,208 
since AP II requires two main prerequisites that allow the application 
of IHL. The first prerequisite is that the rebel forces must be 
sufficiently “organized” so as to be able to use substantial force.209 
The second precondition is that these groups must retain a 
considerable part of the state’s territory from which they can organize 
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extensive attacks against the state.210 Because states rarely 
acknowledge that they have lost substantial territory to rebellious 
groups, AP II has not been used in practice.211 Arguably, since the 
threshold of IHL in non-transnational force is intangible,212 the legal 
framework of HRL can extend assistance in safeguarding the rights 
of civilians.213 
Furthermore, IHL and HRL can interact through application 
in internal conflicts and disorders.214 Article 1 of AP II explicitly 
excludes internal conflicts and disorders from the ambit of armed 
conflicts and application of IHL;215 however, internal disorders can 
invoke its application.216 Still, internal armed conflicts can deteriorate 
state conditions, and escalated violence—such as riots and 
tensions—can instigate a state emergency such that states can 
derogate from basic human rights obligations 217 and apply IHL.218 
Within the same context, a strict division between HRL and IHL will 
hamper protection to civilians, such that neither IHL nor HRL would 
be applicable, because in practice most human rights are not 
applicable during emergencies219 and IHL is not applicable in an 
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emergency that is not an armed conflict.220 Therefore, it is only 
reasonable to incorporate both HRL and IHL in harmony to expand 
protection to civilians.221 Conclusively, a hybrid application of non-
derogable human rights and IHL can be fused together to ensure 
tranquility of society and protection of civilians, where each set of 
rules will work efficiently irrespective of the characteristics of the 
case.222 
However, including HRL in non-transactional conflicts poses 
certain problems regarding practicality and application. This is 
because HRL usually obliges states not to infringe upon individuals’ 
rights.223 In an internal conflict or non-transnational armed conflict, it 
is nonstate bodies, groups, or organizations that violate human 
rights.224 So, in practice, invoking HRL in the legal realms of IHL is 
not truly practical.225 To resolve this issue of practicality, scholars 
argue that the interpretation of HRL must be made in such a way that 
nonstate bodies, groups, and organizations must also be held 
accountable for violating human rights.226 On the other hand, other 
scholars suggest that the application of HRL requires effective 
control over the boundaries of a state, and if certain forces have 
gained control over parts of a country then HRL is unenforceable.227 
Therefore, the practicality and enforcement of HRL application 
remain intangible during particular conditions of armed conflict 
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within the uncontrolled territories of a state.228 Nevertheless, 
lawmakers are trying to resolve this issue by integrating individual 
responsibility in addition to state responsibility under HRL. The 
system they are trying to create prohibits grave violations of HRL by 
individuals.229 For instance, Article 2 of the Declaration of Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards (DMHS) states that “standards shall be 
respected by, and applied to all persons, groups and authorities, 
irrespective of their legal status and without any adverse 
discrimination.”230 Here the DMHS’s explicit obligation to nonstate 
bodies to respect HRL is an example of the assimilation of the 
problem of HRL’s practicality during nontransnational armed 
conflicts.231 Similar to Article 2 of DMHS, Article 28 of the African 
Charter of Human Rights (ACHR) states that “[e]very individual shall 
have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without 
discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, 
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.”232 
Moreover, the ACHR also unambiguously obliges individuals and 
nonstate bodies to respect HRL.233 References and articulations of 
approaches, such as Article 28 of the ACHR and Article 2 of the 
DMHS, provide feasibility in the application, enforceability, and 
practicality of HRL in integration with IHL during nontransnational 
armed conflicts.234 
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Another perspective on the interaction between IHL and 
HRL is in the enforceability of HRL by HRL bodies.235 Some 
scholars contend that HRL bodies like the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) cannot review violations and infringement of IHL while 
enforcing and reviewing HRL.236 They substantiate their contentions 
by arguing that HRL bodies can only encompass the legal 
frameworks that define them; therefore, they cannot outstep their 
jurisdictional limits.237 For instance, individuals and complainants can 
only file complaints, in general, regarding guaranteed rights under the 
ICCPR.238 
By examining the detailed discussions above regarding IHL 
and HRL interactions, it is evident that HRL bodies can review IHL 
in their interpretations.239 For instance, HRL bodies can refer to IHL 
to understand the context of infringements of HRL during an armed 
conflict, whether transnational or internal.240 The courts need to rely 
on the concepts of IHL to interpret principles of HRL;241 such was 
the case in elaborative discussion of interpreting the term arbitrary 
while reviewing the right to life under Article 6 of ICCPR.242 
VI. CONCLUSION 
IHL and HRL were historically developed in specific 
situations for entirely different purposes.243 Both bodies of law 
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therefore have different parameters and dynamics, with IHL being 
essentially tactical and contractual in nature244 and HRL being much 
more universalistic and idealistic.245 This is because the logic of IHL 
hinged on the realization of mutual obligations between parties, both 
of whom—at least in theory—had an interest in defining and limiting 
the character of war.246 Meanwhile, HRL has its origins in the desire 
to limit the circumstances in which conflict might be engendered; it 
is, moreover, concerned with far wider areas of human activity than 
simple conflicts.247 It is these essential tensions that underpin the 
difficulties of balancing the two frameworks within armed conflicts, 
especially when some participants do not perceive themselves as 
bound by the constraints of IHL.248 
In terms of their provenance and development, IHL and 
HRL are both branches of general international law.249 The 
distinction between the two may be illustrated through the situations 
in which they are invoked and applied.250 International humanitarian 
law is most commonly applied to persons or communities in extremis, 
where combatants or noncombatants may be denied the right to life 
through various means.251 Meanwhile, HRL is drawn into a much 
wider range of situations, both inside and outside the context of 
armed conflicts.252 In this respect, the remit of one may be said to 
begin where that of the other ends: as the equivalent pressures of 
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reconstruction supplant the immediate perils and uncertainties of 
conflict, HRL emerges parallel to IHL operation.253 The latter may 
not always be discontinued on the cessation of hostilities, as the onset 
of famine or diseases may require its continued operations.254 
Meanwhile, the application of HRL is derogable.255 For 
instance, Article 15 of the ECHR, Article 4 of the ICCPR, and Article 
27 of the ACHR collectively provide a tariff whereby states can 
derogate from their treaty responsibilities.256 In brief, these are as 
follows: the state(s) concerned must officially recognize an 
emergency that threatens sovereignty and make the correlative public 
declaration to the relevant authority.257 However, there are certain 
“non-derogable” rights, such as the right to life, that remain in 
place.258 A state cannot derogate from an entire convention, but only 
from those elements to which the perceived threat applies.259 
Furthermore, the state’s response should be proportionate to that 
threat.260 The final condition lies in the principle that derogation 
                                                 
 253 Ben-Naftali, supra note 61, at 9; see also TATHIANA FLORES ACUÑA, THE 
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN EL SALVADOR: A HUMANITARIAN LAW 
PERSPECTIVE 34 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). 
 254 See Herik & Duffy supra note 235, at 374; see also Kalin, supra note 236, 
at 445. 
 255 See Bhuta, supra note 152, at 59. 
 256 ID. 
 257 See Robert K. Goldman, Extraterritorial application of the human 
rights to life and personal liberty, including habeas corpus, during situations of 
armed conflict, in Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
104, 105 (Robert Kolb & Gloria Gaggioli eds. 2013); & Roberta Arnold, Terrorism 
in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in 
International Law 475, 483 (Roberta Arnold et al. eds., 2008). 
 258 See for example Article 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), 1976. See also FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, STEPHEN J. 
SCHNABLY, RICHARD WILSON, JONATHAN SIMON, & MARK TUSHNET, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES, CASES, 
AND ANALYSIS 35 (2006); see McCann v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97, para 
161. 
 259 See Oberleitner, supra note 107, at 345. 
 260 Jacques Delisle, States of exception in an exception state: emergency powers law in 
China, in Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality 342, 380 
(Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010) 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
238 
should not result in action that is in any way discriminatory to any 
particular individual or group.261 
Conversely, the veracious interpretation of the doctrine of lex 
specialis by rational scholars construes that specific IHL are given 
preeminence over generalized HRL, where both HRL and IHL 
present contradictory resolutions against unchanged given settings.262 
Through Koskenniemi’s analysis it becomes clear that particular rules 
(lex specialis) can do both: they can either derogate general rules by 
expressing exclusion, or they can complement general rules by 
providing specificity to the given situation by expressing inclusion.263 
Either way, it is the lex specialis that governs the given setting of facts 
in a situation.264 IHL is easily applicable in transnational armed 
conflicts,265 and HRL is more easily applicable in nontransnational 
armed conflicts.266 By examining detailed discussions above regarding 
IHL and HRL interactions, it is evident that HRL bodies can review 
IHL in their interpretations.267 For instance, HRL bodies can refer to 
IHL to understand the context of the infringements of HRL during 
an armed conflict, be it a transnational armed conflict or an internal 
conflict.268 
If this is accepted, then IHL is further dependent upon the 
idea that the limiting of violence is not strictly necessary to achieve 
strategic ends had benefits for both sides.269 By avoiding a reciprocal 
escalation of the conflict—for example, as with massacre and 
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reprisal—both sides could avoid an internecine escalation of 
hostilities, which would obscure or neutralize the original strategic 
objectives.270 Solis, for example, sees this as exemplified in 
eighteenth-century international conflicts, where, even though states 
might be competing for the same resources, neither has any incentive 
to risk the breakdown of military conventions or the unleashing of an 
uncontrolled holocaust.271 
As a result, two important themes develop. First, there is an 
increased conflation on the responsibility of states toward individuals, 
especially toward noncombatants.272 Second, such responsibilities are 
ultimately deemed to be operating on a new, universal, and almost 
super-legal basis, since they are no longer contingent upon formal 
treaties between combatants.273 As Duffy points out, for their 
operation, all concerned parties are bound by formal treaties, such as 
the Hague Regulations of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and AP of 1977, and the Hague Convention on Cultural 
Property of 1954.274 However, the GC of 1949 in particular exceeded 
this requirement by extending liability to all parties irrespective of 
their treaty status.275 Moreover, the 1949 Convention simultaneously 
removed the basis for any justification that might be claimed because 
of breaches or excesses by one or other party;276 this principle was 
reemphasized by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). As Duffy points out, “Non-observance of 
particular binding rules by one party does not justify violations by 
another . . . the ICTY has emphasized that crimes committed by an 
adversary can never justify the perpetration of serious violations of 
IHL.”277 For instance, the 30-article tariff was intended to be 
“disseminated, displayed, read and expounded . . . without distinction 
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based on the political status of countries or territories.”278 The 
preamble then continues to assert that recognition of humankind’s 
inalienable rights “is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world.”279 
The application of IHL in armed conflicts becomes more 
problematic when facing opponents who are prepared to engage with 
civilian populations. For example, attacks may be deemed unlawful 
when they are directed against civilians or “civilian objects,” or where 
insufficient distinction is made between military and civilian targets: 
no protagonists can escape censure when they accept that collateral 
damage among civilians is unavoidable.280 As may be construed from 
the above, the cardinal rule within IHL is that civilians should be 
protected from attacks. Such immunity is only surrendered “where 
the person takes an active and direct part in hostilities. Direct 
participation should be narrowly construed, and does not include, for 
example support for or affiliation to the adversary.”281 It is in these 
kinds of areas that the interplay of IHL and HRL can become 
particularly complex, especially given the growth of irregular warfare 
and terrorist techniques. It is, however, problematic to attach such 
logic to guerrilla or terrorist strategies.282 Further complications are 
implied where force is applied in the guise of humanitarian 
intervention, i.e., the opening of hostilities against a combatant for 
the specific declared purpose of preventing humanitarian crimes.283 
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In conclusion, this brings the discussion back full circle, since 
the principles of international law—which enshrine universal human 
rights—are indivisible from those set out in the UN Charter.284 Just 
as IHL proscribes justification for excesses through the actions of an 
opponent, so HRL provides a minimum and extra-treaty tariff of 
rights for individuals and communities. As Chesterman points out, an 
examination of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention must 
consider “not merely the law concerning the use of force by states, 
but the status of an international rule of law more generally.”285 The 
aggregate experience within any armed conflicts is that it will face 
actions by some elements that are totally contrary to both the spirit 
and letter of HRL and IHL, as expressed in the principle that 
“[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any 
state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
responsibilities, rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration and 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.”286 Therefore, 
it remains to be seen whether these tensions will be alleviated by 
some harmonization of IHL and HRL in the future. 
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